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W11AT IS A STATUTE UNDER THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE?
The construction of the word "statute" has an important bear-
ing upon the jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court.
Section 237 (a) of the Judicial Code substantially repeating
the language of the Judiciary Act of 1789, provided before
1925 for review by the United States Supreme Court upon writ
of error of a
[359]
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" ... final judgment or decree in any suit in the highest
court of a state in which a decision in the suit could be had,
where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute
of, or an authority exercised under, the United States and the
decision is against their validity; or where is drawn in ques-
tion the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised undcr
any State on the ground of their being repugnant to the Con-
stitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision
is in favor of their validity...." 1 (Italics ours).
The taking of jurisdiction in such cases by the United States
Supreme Court was obligatory, as contrasted with a number of
cases in which the Court's jurisdiction, theretofore obligatory,
was in 1916 made subject to the Court's discretionary juris-
diction through writ of certiorari.
By the Act of February 13, 1925, the so-called Judges' Bill,
proposed and adopted for the purpose of reducing the obligatory
jurisdiction of the Court, the italicized words in the above quo-
tation were stricken out, and the obligatory jurisdiction from
the highest state courts was thus limited to questions of the
validity of treaties and of federal and state statutes.2  The
language of section 237 (a) remains as so altered, except that
appeal was in 1928 substituted for writ of error.3
Under section 237 (a) as it stood before 1925, the United
States Supreme Court clearly had an obligatory jurisdiction to
review decisions of the highest state courts involving the validity
of municipal ordinances, and the validity of regulations, legis-
lative in character, issued by federal or state administrative
bodies under authority delegated to them; for such ordinances
and such regulations were either statutes or "an authority exer-
cised under" either the United States or the state. The juris-
diction of the Court being undoubted before 1925, it was
immaterial whether the Court based its action in taking juris-
diction upon the word "statute" or upon the words "an authority
exercised under;" and judicial expressions before 1925 as to
the one or the other basis of jurisdiction may be classed as dicta.
Chief Justice Marshall in Weston v. City of Charlcston'
139 STAT. 726 (1916), 28 U. S. C. § 344 (1926).
243 STAT. 937 (1925), 28'U. S. C. § 344 (1926).
3 Frankfurter and Landis, The Supreme Court under the Judiciary Aot
of 1925 (1928) 42 HARv. L. REV. 1, 27-29, properly refer to the change
from writ of error to appeal by the Act of January 31, 1928, as "a
warning on how not to legislate.", :
.42 Pet. 449 (U. S. 1829). The same statement applies to Smoot v,
HIeyl, 227 U..S. 518, 33 Sup. Ct. 336 (1913), where the court said that
a municipal regulation of the District of Columbila was an authority
exercised under the United States; and to New Mexico v. Denver
Rio Grande R. R., 203 U. S. 38, 27 Sup. Ct. 1 (1906), where a territorial
statute was said to be an authority under the United States. Nor does
Board of Public Utility Commissioners v. Manila Electric R. R. & Light
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stated that a city ordinance of Charleston 'was an exercise of
an "authority under the State of South Carolina," but this state-
ment did not necessarily imply that the ordinance was not also
a state statute; and the jurisdictional statement in Howezc Ina,-
ance Company v. City Counicil of Avgsta. - is even less decisive.
It is difficult to understand the statement of Justice Brandeis
in the recent case of Kig Manufacthrwig Co. v,. City Council
of Azugiista r that these cases on full consideration settled the
basis of the Cour's jurisdiction.
Speaking for a unanimous Court in Atlantic Coast Linc R. R.
v. Goldsboro and in Reinnan v. Little Rock,8 Justice Pitney
referred to a municipal ordinance as a statute of a state under
section 237 of the Judicial Code. Speaking also for a unanimous
Court, Justice Brandeis said in Zzicht v. King 0 in 1922:
"A city ordinance is a law of the state within the meaning
of § 237 of the Judicial Code as amended, which provides a
review by writ of error where the validity of a law is sus-
tained by the highest courts of the State in which a decision
in the suit could be had."
Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Goldsboro was cited by Justice
Brandeis in support of this statement. And in Live Oak Watcr
Users' Association v. Railroad Corinission of California, de-
cided under the act as it stood before 1925, Justice IcReynolds
said for the Court:
"Under repeated rulings here for jurisdictional purposes the
order of the Commission must be treated as though an act of
the Legislature."
A similar statement was made for the Court by Justice Van
Devanter in Lake Erie & Western R. R. v,. State Pu.blic Utilities
Commissionz," where an administrative order is said to be a
"state law" for the purpose of jurisdiction.
The whole context, makes it clear that in using the terms "law
of the state", "act of the legislature" and "state law," Justices
Brandeis, McReynolds and Van Devanter were attributing the
Co., 249 U. S. 262, 39 Sup. Ct. 272 (1919), appear at all decisive in
support of Justice Brandeis's view.
593 U. S. 116 (1876).
6 4S Sup. Ct. 489 (U. S. 1928).
7232 U. S. 548, 34 Sup. Ct. 364 (1914).
11237 U. S. 171, 35 Sup. Ct. 511 (1915).
'260 U. S. 174, 176, 43 Sup. Ct. 24, 25 (1922).
10269 U. S. 354, 356, 46 Sup. Ct. 149, 150 (1926).
311249 U. S. 422, 39 Sup. Ct. 345 (1919) ; see also Bluefield Waterworls
& Improvement Co. v. Public Service Commission, 202 U. S. G79, 43 Sup-
Ct. 675 (1923), and Northern PaCific Ry. v. Department of Public Work:s,
286 U. S. 39, 45 Sup. Ct. 412 (1925).
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Courts' jurisdiction to the term state "statute" in section 237
rather than to the phrase "an authority exercised under any
state." On the basis of the dicta before the amendment of 1925,
it may therefore be said that the weight lay with the view that
the term "statute" includes municipal ordinances and adminis-
trative regulations of a legislative character. And this view
is supported by the fact that for three years after the coming
into effect of the Act of 1925 the United States Supreme Court
took jurisdiction of such cases on writ of error as matters of
obligatory jurisdiction without any question being raised by
parties or by the court.
In King Manufacturing Co. v. City Council of Augusta,12 de-
cided May 14, 1928, the issue was squarely raised and deter-
mined, bbcause of doubt upon the part of some members of the
Court, although counsel on both sides treated the case as one
rightly brought on writ of error. Speaking through Justice
Van Devanter the Court determined that a municipal ordinance
is a state statute within the language of section 237. Justice
Brandeis, in an elaborate dissent in which Justice Holmes con-
curred, urged that a municipal ordinance was not a state statute,
and that under the terms of section 237 the Court should exer-
cise by certiorari a discretion as to whether to take the case.
Through the same member of the Court, and with the same dis-
sents, the Court, in Sultan Railway and Timber Co. v. Depart-
ment of Labor and Industries,13 on May 14 also determined
that orders legislative in character, made by a state bureau,
are state statutes under section 237. In both the King and the
Sultan cases the judgments of state courts were affirmed. In
Sprout v. City of South Bend, ' decided on the same day, Justice
Brandeis, speaking for a unanimous Court in reversing a state
court, assumes it to be settled that the case was properly brought
by writ of error, although involving a municipal ordinance.
The dissent of Justice Brandeis in the King case is persuasive,
and appears convincing when first read. But doubts are raised
by further analysis. The points raised by the dissent are (1)
that the construction given to the section runs covlnter to the
general purpose of the Act of 1925 to reduce the obligatory
jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court; (2) that "it
completely frustrates the particular purpose which Congress
must have had in striking from section 237 the clause 'or an
authority exercised under any state';" (3) that it preserves in
the obligatory jurisdiction of the Court a number of cases of
trifling significance, and (4) that it is opposed to the natural
12 Supra note 6.
148 Sup. Ct. 505 (U. S. 1928).
1448 Sup. Ct. 502 (U. S. 1928).
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meaning of the phrase "statute of any state." Each of these
may be briefly examined.
(1) The general purpose of the Act of 1925 is undisputed.
The measure was proposed by a committee of the Supreme Court
for the purpose of reducing the work of that Court. An excel-
lent history of the act is found in Frankfurter and Landis, The
Business of the Supreme Court..5 But as Justice Van Devanter
said for the Court, "the purpose was to cut down and change
our jurisdiction in particular respects, and to leave it as before
in others." Clearly section 237 retained obligatory jurisdiction
as to the validity of federal and state statutes, and the scope of
such obligatory jurisdiction depends upon the meaning of the
term "statute" as used before and in the Act of 1925. Little
of congressional intent as to the point here at issue is to be
derived from the general purpose of the act to reduce the obliga-
tory jurisdiction of the Court.
(2) But Justice Brandeis urges that there must have been
some purpose in omitting the words "or an authority exercised
under" from two places in section 237 (a), and that Congress
has done a fruitless thing in omitting these words if state
administrative regulations and municipal ordinances are to be
comprehended within the phrase "statute of any state." This
argument would be convincing, if true. But Justice Brandeis
himself suggests that, independently of municipal ordinances
and commission orders, possibly eight cases between 1916 and
1925 may have come to the United States Supreme Court by
virtue of the words "or an authority exercised under." Frank-
furter and Landis, moreover, writing in 1927, offer another ex-
planation, independent of Justice Brandeis' suggestion:
"Ever since the First Judiciary Act, the Supreme Court had
been able to review the judgment of a state court which denied
an attack, based on the Federal Constitution, on 'an authority
exercised under any state'. The Act of 1916 eliminated review
upon an assailed exercise of authority; the 'validity* of author-
ity, not an illegitimate exercise of it, alone furnished warrant
for a writ of error from the Supreme Court. Subtle distinc-
tions were thereby invited, which were happily dispensed with
by the Judges' Bill. This proposal probably did not effect a
reduction of cases; it did avoid waste in litigation." 26
According to these commentators the omission of these words
was primarily for the purpose of clarification. Justice Brandeis
suggests also a possible reduction in number of cases.
'1 (1927) c. 7; see also the recent article by the same author., cited
sUvpra note 3.
'Is TuE Busnss OF THE SuPrnRM COURT (1927) 205-260, and 20-207,
nn. 37, 38. For an opposing statement see the recent article by Frankfurter
and Landis, cited spra note 3.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
(3) The argument that the view taken by the Court preserves
in the obligatory jurisdiction of the Court a number of cases
of trifling significance is of legal weight only as it supports
the view that the language of the statute intended to exclude
such cases. For, if the intent to preserve such jurisdiction were
clear, the statute would have to be construed to preserve it.
Justice Brandeis is clearly correct in his statement that the
constitutionality of municipal ordinances can rarely be deter-
mined simply by applying a general rule, but the same state-
ment applies to statutes which clearly remain within the obliga-
tory jurisdiction.
Assuming the language of section 237 (a) to be in doubt
as to obligatory jurisdiction over municipal ordinances, are the
questions presented by such ordinances (and by federal and
state administrative regulations as well) more trivial than those
of which the Court must under the statute clearly take juris-
diction? And would the transfer from obligatory tW discretion-
ary jurisdiction necessarily reduce the Court's burden of work
to the extent suggested by Justice Brandeis? With respect to
new problems, municipal ordinances present questions equally
as important as state statutes. Irrespective of obligatory or
discretionary jurisdiction, the Court would have been sub-
stantially compelled to consider on their merits the recent zoning
and set-back cases of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,1' Gorieb v.
Fox,"' Zahn v. Board of Public Works,10 and Nectow v. City
of Cambridge.20 The consideration of these cases on the merits
laid the foundation for a m6morandum opinion in Beery v.
Houghton; 21 and without their consideration on the merits, the
Court would have found difficulty in denying petitions for cer-
tiorari in Village of Terrace Park v. Errett 22 and in Village of
University Heights v. Cleveland Jewish Orphan Home.
23
Were cases of this character altogether within the discretion-
ary jurisdiction, their consideration would have involved (1)
the preliminary consideration of each case on petition for cer-
• tiorari, (2) the further consideration on the merits of each
case in which the Court granted the petition for certiorari. In
the group of cases just referred to, obligatory jurisdiction prob-
ably would not have increased the Court's work. It might have
resulted in the substitution of memorandum opinions for de-
nials of certiorari. The same statement may apply in some
17 272 U. S. 365, 47 Sup. Ct. 114 (1926).
18274 U. S. 603, 47 Sup. Ct. 675 (1927).
19274 U. S. 325, 47 Sup. Ct. 594 (1927).
20 48 Sup. Ct. 447 (U. S. 1928).
21273 U. S. 671, 47 Sup. Ct. 474 (1927).
22273 U. S. 710, 47 Sup. Ct. 100 (1926).
23275 U. S. 569, 48 Sup. Ct. 141 (1927).
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other cases involving municipal ordinances and administrative
regulations of a legislative character, and the difference in
burden between an obligatory and a discretionary jurisdiction
may not be as great as Justice Brandeis fears.
(4) Justice Brandeis says:
"To construe the phrase 'statute of any state' as applying
to a municipal ordinance disregards the common and appropriate
use of the words, ignores decisions which for nearly a century
have governed our jurisdiction to review judgments of state
courts sustaining the validity of such ordinances, and tends to
defeat the general purpose of the Act of 1925 'to relieve this
court by limiting further the absolute right to a review by it'." -1
This is the language of a partisan. It assumes that the general
purpose applies to and controls every change wrought by the
Act. Upon slight basis of authority, it alleges that the opinion
of the Court "ignores decisions thdt for nearly a century have
governed our jurisdiction."
But the primary issue here is as to the meaning of the word
"statute." This word is used twice in section 237 (a), once
referring to a "statute of the United States," and once to "a
statute of any state," and similar uses occur in section 237 (b).
The term "statute" appears to mean the same in all these cases,
and the term "statute of any state" is used in the same context
in section 240 (b) of the same act as amended in 1925.:  The
Court in construing the phrase "statute of any state" in the
present case appears necessarily to have determined the content
of the word "statute" in these other cases.
How is the congressional intent as to the meaning of this
language to be determined? Congressional purpose or intent
is a formless thing. There is no specific purpose or intent upon
the part of 435 representatives and 96 senators, either individu-
ally or collectively. There can be no such tiring. Assuming
the highest competence upon the part of these members, only
a few of them can by any possibility have any expertness upon
the technical problems respecting the jurisdiction of the United
States Supreme Court. As a body they had and could have
had no specific intent in omitting in two places in section 237
(a) the words "or an authority exercised under." No specific
intent can be imputed to them as to this particular change be-
cause of the generally understood purpose of the whole act. No
reports, debates or committee discussions appear to lend aid.
The intent of a legislative body must primarily be found in
the language of the statute through which that body speals.
If the language is clear, the Court needs no aid. If it is uncer-
24 Supra note 6, at 501.
2543 STAT. 939 (1925), 28 U. S. C. § 347 (b) (1026).
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tain, the Court may determine what it terms the "legislative
intent" from the language aided by certain external tests. The
test of general or specific purpose aimed at in changing this
section, fails, when standing alone, because it has no basis out-
side the terms of the statute itself. We get little aid from "the
common and appropriate use of the words," because the same
word differs in meaning with different uses. In seeking to apply
the test of "common and appropriate use" Justice Brandeis ap-
proaches the dogmatism of Humpty Dumpty, who said: "When
I use a word it means just what I choose it to mean-neither
more nor less." But it is possible to apply to this case certain
tests as to the meaning of words.
(a) If the same or similar words are used elsewhere in the
same Act, and if the context of the use is not such as to vary
their meaning, the words should receive a uniform construc-
tion. This rule obviously applies to the same words as used in
sections 237 (b) and 240 (b). But Justice Brandeis urges that
his position in the present case is supported by the prior judicial
construction of the words "any statute of a state" in section 266
so as not to include municipal ordinances. 2  And three weeks
after the decision in King Manufacturing Co. v. City Council
of August, 27 a unanimous Court, in Ex parte Collins, 28 through
Justice Brandeis, reaffirmed the position that the language of
section 266 does not embrace municipal ordinances. But are
there differences in the context of section 266? Certain elements
of distinction appear from the opinion of Justice Brandeis in
the Collins case. Section 266 as it now reads requires the action
of three federal judges to enjoin or restrain, under certain con-
ditions, "the enforcement, operation or execution of any statute
of a state by restraining the action of any officer of such state
in the enforcement or execution of such statute, or in the en-
forcement or execution of any order made by an administrative
board or commission acting under and pursuant to the statutes
of such state," and requires that at least five days' notice be
given "to the governor and to the attorney general of the state."
(Italics ours). The words here italicized, when read together,
appear rather definitely to limit the section to action by the
central state authority. The requirement of notice to the gov-
ernor and attorney general appeared in the original form of
20 36 STAT. 1162 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 380 (1926).
2 Supra note 6.
28 48 Sup. Ct. 585 (U. S. 1928). Frankfurter and Landis, op. oil. supra
note 3, at 27, suggest that a jurisdictional problem presents itself if a
municipal ordinance is regarded as a state statute for review as a matter
of right from the circuit court of appeals under § 240 (b), but not as
a state statute for review as of right where action is by three judges under
§ 266. This, however, appears to present no difficulty.
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this enactment in 1910,2 and in the Collins case Justice Brandeis
refers to a statement of Senator Burton in debate in 1910, sup-
porting the construction of the word "statute" to exclude munic-
ipal ordinances. It would appear therefore that the use of
similar language in section 266 gives little aid in the construc-
tion of section 237 (a). Section 266 was not intended to in-
clude municipal ordinances, and it was made to include orders
of an administrative board or commission only by an amend-
ment of 1913.30 The limited intent of section 266 appears from
the whole language of the section. No such limited intent ap-
pears from the language of section 237 (a), as amended in 1925.
(b) A second test is that of the meaning of a term at the
time of the enactment of a statute. The term here under dis-
cussion came into the statute in 1789, and has remained the
same throughout. Presumably it has had the same content
since 1789, but the omission of the words "or an authority exer-
cised under" in 1925 primarily raises the question as to what
was the jurisdiction in 1925 under the terms "a statute of any
state," for these words were left in the statute by the draftsmen
of the Act of 1925 as the basis for the determination of future
jurisdiction of the court. There was no necessity that the court
specifically determine the content of these words before the Act
of 1925. Yet dicta are of importance as indicating the content
of the term "statute" before 1925, and it has already been pointed
out that the weight of dicta in 1925 supports the view of Justice
Van Devanter that municipal ordinances and administrative
regulations of a legislative character were included in the term.
The manner in which the term was used in 1925 by those who
must act under it is of much greater significance in statutory
construction than an allegation as to "the common and appro-
priate use of the words." And although the term "law" may
be admitted to be broader than the term "statute," it is of some
weight that municipal ordinances have long been held to be state
laws under the contract clause and the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States. To the uninitiated
layman, it is just as inappropriate to call a municipal ordinance
a state law as to call it a state statute.
(c) The meaning of a statute as understood by its framers
is always of importance if so expressed that it may properly be
presented to a court; and in construing the Constitution of the
United States, the Supreme Court has given great weight to the
29 36 STAT. 557 (1910), 28 U. S. C. § 380 (1926).
3037 STAT. 1013 (1913), 28 U. S. C. § 380 (1926). There is some force
in the view that the amendment of 1913 should have been unnccecTary
because the term "statutes" as now construed should include not only
acts of the state legislature but also administrative regulations of purely
state authorities.
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opinions of the framers, however that opinion may have been ex-
pressed.31 Here the specific intent of the framers was not before
the court in any outwardly shown form. But here the actual
"intent" of Congress was specifically the intent of the United
States Supreme Court through a committee of its own members.
And the members of the Court most likely to be familiar with
this specific intent of the measure were the members of the
committee charged with the responsibility for the measure,
Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds and Sutherland. The drafts-
manship of the measure was primarily the work of Justice Van
Devanter, who wrote the opinion in the present case, an opinion
concurred in by his committee associates, Justices McReynolds
and Sutherland.
On the whole, the opinion of the Court seems preferable to
the dissent. The question of jurisdiction, although unargued
by counsel, received the thorough consideration of the Court.
One is tempted to call the contest within the Court a "tempest
in a teapot." The heat of argument in the case is out of propor-
tion to the issue involved. The opinion of the Court is not
nearly as vulnerable as Justice Brandeis seeks to make it appear,
and the future welfare of the Court did not depend upon such
a decision as Justice Brandeis sought. If the Court finds itself
unduly burdened by the scope of the obligatory jurisdiction as
determined by this case, there should be little difficulty in ob-
taining a reduction by methods similar to those employed in
1925. If a statute properly conferred jurisdiction, it is not
the province of the Court to narrow that jurisdiction. A good
portion of Justice Brandeis' dissent may perhaps more appro-
priately constitute an argument in support of congressional
action.
W. F. D.
REGULATION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY AS TO INSANITY IN CRIMINAL
CASES
There are now in practice two principal methods of eliminating
the evils caused by the use of expert testimony where insanity
is the defense to a criminal prosecution. One is the so-called
Briggs Law of Massachusetts, which has not yet been adopted
elsewhere, and the other is a modified form of the Expert Testi-
mony Bill sponsored by the American Institute of Criminal Law,
which has been passed by the legislatures of six states. The
Massachusetts law has proved the more effective, and suggests
the conclusion .that the apparent evils of expert testimony can
be traced directly to the conflict between the medical conception
of mental disorder and the legal conception of criminal responsi-
31 Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 47 Sup. Ct. 21 (1926).
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bility; 1 that it is this conflict which, more than anything else,
destroys the weight of expert testimony, confuses the issue of
fact with the issue of insanity, places the expeit at the mercy
of the unqualified, and thus subjects the entire medical pro-
fession to public and legal ridicule which it does not merit.
In 1915 the American Institute of Criminal Law and Crimin-
ology, drew up a bill 2 known as the Expert Testimony Bill and
recommended that it be passed by the state legislatures as a
practical means of abolishing the abuses of expert testimony
in criminal cases. It provided that the trial judge in such cases
should have the power to appoint three disinterested physicians
to examine a defendant who pleaded insanity. They were to
make a report in writing and their appointment was not to pre-
clude either side from calling other experts during the trial.
Since that time five states have passed laws substantially the
same as the model which the Institute sponsored. These states
are California,3 Colorado,4 Indiana3 Ohio,r and Wisconsin.7 New
York" passed a similar statute in 1871, but it has not proved
'The legal tests go on outworn assumptions, (1) that lmowlcdge of
the nature and quality of an act . .. or the incapacity to kmow right
irom wrong is the sole or even the most important element of mental
disorder. (2) That such kmowledge is the sole instigator or guide of
conduct, (3) that the capacity of knowing right from wrong can ba
intact and perfectly functioning even though the defendant is othewiL-e
of demonstrably unsolmd mind. . . . In other words, the law ncglcct:
the fundamental notion of the unity of the mind and the interrelation:hip
of the mental processes. Gluck, Psychiatry and the C-i;n5In! Lrp (10923)
14 VA. L. Rnv. 155, 166; see Anderson v. State, 43 Conn. 514, 519 (1S76);
cf. GLUECK, MiENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRn, INAL LAw (1925) c. 6, for
an exhaustive discussion of the subject of responsibility; cf. alo A,::omn,
PSYCHOLOGY APPLIED TO LEGAL EIDENCE (1906); WHIM, INSANZITY AIM
THE CRISIINAL LAW (1923); BARNEs, THE REP=ssIox or Cnri . (1925);
Hand, Considerations Regarding E.xpcrt Tcstiznony (1901) 15 H,%,v.
L. Rnv. 40; Briggs, Medico-Legal In2anity and the HJpi tctitc! ().- -
tion (1923) 14 J. CRm. L. 62; Keedy, In.anity and Cramin.l R,: ponnibit y
(1917) 30 HA v. L. REv. 535; ibid. 724; Adler, Organization of ra;hq~f$
Work in the C&iminal Courts (1917) S J. Crxas. L. 362; White, Ex.pi,-t
Testimony in Criminal Procedure (1920) 11 J. Cnun. L. 499; Hamilton,
Making the Punishmnent Fit the Crie (1921) 12 J. CRni. L. 159; Note
(1922) 36 HARV. L. REv. 333.
2 The text of this bill is given in Keedy, Insanity and Criminal RCe.powsi-
bility (1915) 6 J. CmRm. L. 672.
Cal. Laws 1925, c. 156, § 1871.
dColo. Laws 1927, c. 90, §§ 2-4.
SInd. Acts 1927, c. 102, § 172.
6 Ohio Laws 1927, §§ 13603, 13609. Power to pass such regulatory stat-
utes was expressly given to the legislature by the Ohio Constitution of
1912, art. 2, § 39.
7 WIS. STAT. (1927) c. 357, §§ 1-6.
8 N. Y. Laws 1871, c. 666, §§ 1, 2, as amended N. Y. Laws 1910, c. 557,
§ 658; N. Y. CODE CRIum Pnoc. § 65S.
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successful." Michigan 10 passed one in its simplest form in 1905,
which was declared unconstitutional "1 on grounds open to criti-
cism. The Wisconsin statute dates from 1921, the California
statute from 1925, and the others from 1927. It is hazarded
that these statutes will not prove satisfactory. Perhaps the best
proof of this is the report of a special committee of the New
York State Crime Commission, submitted in 1928, recommending
that the old New York law be entirely revised by amendment."
While the more recent statutes of other states have been more
carefully drawn, they nevertheless contain the weaknesses which
made the New York law ineffective. With the exception of
Wisconsin and Indiana, these laws are couched in discretionary
terms. The judge may or may not appoint experts when the
plea is raised. Furthermore he alone is to decide who are
qualified. The result is that the success of the law depends
directly upon the wisdom and intelligence of the trial judge.",
9 The killing of Stanford White by Harry K. Thaw resulted in four
"judicial or quasi-judicial" determinations of the question of the prisoner's
insanity. In a habeas corpus proceeding instituted in 1909 to procure
Thaw's release Justice Mills speaking of the above proceedings and of
the report of the commission, appointed by the trial judge in the first
trial for murder, stating that the prisoner was sane at the time of
trial, says: "Under the statute such report was for a preliminary pur-
pose merely . . . to determine whether or not the trial should proceed,"
Ppople v. Lamb, 118 N. Y. Supp. 389, 392 (Sup. Ct. 1909). The statute
was expressly declared to be discretionary in People v. MeElvaine, 125
N. Y. 596, 609, 26 N. E. 929, 932 (1891).
10 Mich. Acts 1905, No. 175, § 3.
11 People v. Dickerson, 164 Mich. 148, 129 N. W. 199 (1910). The court
said that it infringed due process of law, and that by transferring the
power to choose witnesses to a member of the judicial department it
violated the state constitutional provision for the separation of the powers
of the government. The power granted by the legislature seems to have
been more nearly that of appointing referees than of choosing witnesses
for a side. Due process of law does not require rigid adherence to rules
of procedure. See Note (1910) 24 HARv. L. Rnv. 483.
=N. Y. STATE CRIME COMMISSION; SPECIAL REPORT ON FIRE AMS
LEGISLATION AND PSYCHIATRIC AND EXPERT TESTIMONY (1928) 17.
13 "One reason for the apparent . .. abuse of the plea of insanity has
been the fact that initiation of the plea has depended upon laymen ... as
for instance, the judge, the prison officials, and, of course the defense at-
torney. As a result . . . the cases in which the proceedings have been
begun are either the obvious ones, those in which there is but little doubt
even in the minds of laymen, or those in which the plea . . . appears to
be advantageous strategy for the defense.... The upshot of this situa-
tion is that the whole matter becomes a partisan one. Some district
attorneys . . . instead of endeavoring to determine the truth . . . contest
the plea regardless of the facts. Instead of permitting the psychiatrists
retained by each side to consult with each other in an effort to agree
on the facts, they assume that the other side is made up entirely of
incapable or dishonest men and insist on fighting the matter out.... The
present disrepute of expert testimony, is much more the fault of the
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It assumes that a busy member of the judiciary will acquaint
himself with the doings of the medical men in his locality,
ascertain who are the specialists in psychiatry, and familiarize
himself with the medical knowledge of mental disorders in order
that he may choose the physicians most competent to report on
the mental condition of the defendant.
This difficulty is avoided under the Mlassachusetts system.'
machinery than it is of the individual psychiatrists or even of the lawyerzs.
Overholser, Psychiatry and the Courts in Massachusetts (1928) 19 J.
Cnmx. L. 75, 78.
1- Mass. Acts 1927, c. 59, § 1, amending Mass. Acts 1921, c. 415; Mass.
Acts 1923, c. 331; Mlass. Acts 1925, c. 169, now reads as follows: "When-
ever a person is indicted by a grand jury for a capital offense or when-
ever a person, who is known to have been indicted for any other offense
more than once or to have been previously convicted of a felony, is in-
dicted by a grand jury or bound over for trial in the superior court, the
clerk of the court in which the indictment is returned, or the clerk of
the district court or the trial justice, as the case may be, shall give notice
to the department of mental diseases, and the department shall cause such
person to be examined with a view to determine his mental condition and
the existence of any mental disease or defect which would affect his criminal
responsibility. - Whenever the probation officer of such court has in his
possession or whenever the inquiry which he is required to make ... dis-
closes facts which if known to the clerk would require notice as aforesaid,
such probation officer shall forthwith communicate the same to the clerl:
who shall thereupon give such notice unless already given. The depart-
ment shall file a report of its investigation with the clerk of the court
in which the trial is to be held, and the report shall be accessible to the
court, the district attorney, and to the attorney for the accused. In the
event of failure by the clerk of the district court or the trial justice
to give notice to the department as aforesaid, the same shall be given by
the clerk of the superior court after entry of the case in said court.
Upon giving the notice required by this section the clerk of a court or
the trial justice shall so certify on the papers. The physician making
the examination shall, upon certification by the department, receive the
same fees and travelling expenses as provided . . . for the examination
of persons committed to institutions. . .. Any clerk of court or trial
justice who willfully neglects to perform any duty imposed upon him by
this section shall be punished by a fine of not more than fifty dollars."
In a report on the results of the first five years under this law [Gluec:,
Psychiatric Examination of Pcrsons Accused of Crime (1926) 36 YAIT-s
L. J. 632, 639] it is mentioned that of the total number reported to the
State Department of Mental Diseases, 72 were never examined and of
these nearly one-half for the reason that they "had been released on
bail and could not be found when the examiners called at the place of
detention." 'In order to remedy this condition the Massachusetts Legis-
lature enacted Mass. Acts 1926, c. 320, §§ 1, 2 relating to the duties of
Probation Officers. The amendment is in part as follows:
"Before the amount of bail of a prisoner charged with an offense
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year is fixed in court, the
court shall obtain from its probation officer all available information
relative to prior criminal prosecutions... of the prisoner... 11
" . . in the case of a criminal prosecution ... charging a person with
an offense punishable by imprisonment for more than one year the proba-
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The wording of the statute makes the mental examination of
certain classes of offenders a routine compulsory affair. The
examination is not made by a group of physicians picked for
the occasion, but by a permanent group of specialists 11 forming
a branch of the State Department of Mental Diseases whose
duties in connection with the regulation of the State Insane
Asylums are varied and continuous the year round.
Four methods of disposing of a case coming within the scope
of the law seem possible., 1. When the report of the examiners
shows the defendant to be insane or mentally deficient the prose-
cuting attorney abandons the prosecution. Under these circum-
stances the criminal charge is filed and the defendant committed
without the formality of a trial. Where the charge is homicide
some prosecuting attorneys have preferred to close the case by
having the court order the jury to return a verdict of not
guilty by reason of insanity. 7 2. When the report of the board
finds the defendant insane but the prosecution insists on pro-
ceeding with the trial, in the only case reported the prosecution
called the examiners and had them testify personally concern-
tion officer shall in any event present to the court such information as
the commission on probation has in its possession relative to prior criminal
prosecutions ... before such person is admitted to bail in court and also
before disposition of the case against him by sentence or placing on file
or probation."
119 "There shall be a department of mental diseases, consisting of a
commissioner of mental diseases and four associate commihsioners. The
commissioner and at least two associate commissioners shall b3 physicians
and experts in the care and treatment of the insane." MASS. GEN. LAWS
(1921) c. 19, § 1. For the many duties of this department &e MASS.
GEN. LAWS (1921), c. 123, §§ 3-5, 7, 10-14, 20, 22, 23.
16 With the exception of the article by Glueck, op. cit. spra note 14,
which has little to say of the procedure under this law, our only source
of information is the report of Dr. Overholser, a member of the Massa-
chuetts Department of Mental Diseases. The report appears in the
record of the proceedings of the National Conference on the Reduction
of Crime published in 1927 by the National Crime Commission, 120 Broad-
way, New York City.
' 7See report of Dr. Overholser, cited supra note 16: "In most cases
... the defendant has been committed without the formality of a trial,
the criminal charge being filed. Certain district attorneys have preferred
to close the case where the offense was homicide by obtaining a verdict
of not guilty by reason of insanity. This has necessitated only the briefest
and most formal of proceedings, . . . rarely lasting as long as an hour.
By agreement of counsel the offense is shown and evidence of the de.
fendant's mental condition is introduced. An instructed verdict is then
promptly returned calling by statute for commitment to a state hospital
for life. By either method ... the matter is finally settled in an orderly,
dignified and efficient way." As to the commitment under report of
insanity by the board in cases other than homicide, MAss. GEN. LAws
(1921) c. 278, § 13 provides that the court may commit "under such limita-
tions as it deems proper."
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ing their examination.' It does not appear that in tlis case the
defendant called partisan e~xperts to corroborate the testimony
of the board but it seems certain that he could have done so.
3. 'When the report of the board finds the defendant sane his
counsel usually drops the issue of insanity,2 kmowing that the
testimony of any hired experts rebutting the report of the board
would have little weight with the jury. 4. When the repoit
of the board finds the defendant sane his counsel may never-
theless wish to pursue this line of defense by calling in his own
experts. Since the Briggs Law has been in operation, less than
one case a year of this soit has been reported.
The Briggs Law was designed to accomplish more than the
mere regulation of the use of expert testimony. Indeed, neither
the word "insanity" nor "expert" is used in the text of the
law as it stands. In a small field of crime, the Commonwealth
need not wait for the defense to raise the issue of insanity,
before examining the defendant to determine his mental condi-
tion. On the theory that the mental condition of a person some-
times had a direct bearing on the type of crime he or she had
committed, 0- the state concluded that all persons committing that
type of crime should be examined by the best medical talent avail-
able. The object of such a law is not merely the abolition of
the old evils of expert testimony, but the protection of society
from crimes induced by mental instability. The defense of in-
sanity is seldom raised except in cases of murder, arson, or
rape, yet the Briggs Law subjects the burglar and every other
felon to the mental examination. The Massachusetts law recog-
nizes the fact that a man may be of dangerously unsound mind
18 See report of Dr. Overholser, cited sz'pra note 16: "Of thi- pri-oners
reported insane, in only one instance was the report of the pzychiatri ts
disregarded. In that case the Judge, despite the evidence givw n on the
stand by the examiners, found the defendant sane and svrttncd him
to state's prison... 2 That it is unlikely that the board's testimony will
again be disregarded may be concluded from the rest of thQ statment
that ". . . within a few months . . . the prisoner manifeste.d his furmer
symptoms, threatening his fellow prisoners and accuing them of cun-
spiring to injure him."
"9Ibid.: "As a result of the neutral and impartial status of the ex-
aminers, occasion to employ the services of partisan expert.. in criminal
cases has practically ceased to exist. The clashcs of such experts ... are
now virtually unkmown in Massachusetts."
20 While Mr. Paul E. Bowers was in charge of the Indiana State Prison
he wrote: "In a recent study that I made of 100 recidivists each of
whom had been convicted not less than four times, 12 of them were insane,
23 were feebleminded, 10 were epileptic and in each instance the mental
defectiveness bore a direct causal relation to their crimes. N, less than
180 trials have been held for these persons." Bowers, The Nccc,_sty for
Medical Exa'amination of Prisoncrs at tle Time of Trial (191S) 21 CASo
& Comm. 482.
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without being legally insane.21 More important still, it recog-
nizes the fact that the statutory penalties for crime arbitrarily
imposed by the state legislature do not prevent the so-called
habitual criminal from repeating the same or similar offense
upon his release after the expiration of his sentence. 'Under
the Massachusetts Laws for the Commitment of the Insane,
those pronounced mentally unsound by the board are confined
for an indeterminate period, and released only when medical
examination has proved them to be cured.
It might seem reasonable to suppose that physicians would,
if given such power as is conferred upon them by the Massa-
chusetts law, find all felons brought before them insane or
psychotic in some degree. This has not been the case in Massa-
chusetts, nor should it be in any state where care is made to
select only the men of highest standing in their profession. A
member of the examining committee of the Massachusetts State
Department of Mental Diseases reported recently that of the
total number of cases examined so far only twenty-one per cent
were diagnosed either as insane or mentally deficient. 2
It might be asked why the salutary results obtained in Massa-
chusetts could not have been accomplished through a change
in the rules of law rather than by recourse to such a novel piece
of legislation as was felt to be necessary to obtain its ends.
It is believed that the answer lies in the fact that the law of
criminal responsibility has so crystalized that society must needs
go around it to avoid the consequences of its operation in con-
nection with the use of expert testimony. Experience has proved
that expert medical testimony is of little value in trials where
such opinion is often most needed to prevent a miscarriage of
21The criminologist has discovered that there are certain forms of
mental disease such as dementia praecox and some stages of paranoia
which make of their victim a more dangerous person potentially to society
than the more obvious forms of insanity which have their accompanying
physical manifestations. There have been developed tests to detect signs
of dementia praecox. "These tests are to dementia praccox in reliableness
and applicability what the Binet-Simon tests are to the feeble-minded.
These psychological symptoms [of dementia praecox] are as clear and
definite to the properly trained man as they are unknown and unappreciated
to those unfamiliar with the method." Hickson, Psychopathology and ito
Influence on Criminal Laau (1921) 92 CENT. L. J. 443, 444. They show that
the mental side of dementia praecox can be well advanced so as to make tho
person dangerous without any of the physical signs.
22 Overholser, op. cit. supra note 13. The number examined up to October
15, 1925 was 295. The number examined to date would probably be over
400. This assumption is based on the fact that the amendments, cited
supra note 14, to the original law refusing bail until examination had
been made, and requiring probation officers to submit records of those
arrested whenever they possessed such information, have probably increased
greatly the number of offenders who come before the Board yearly. See
Glueck, op. cit. supra note 14, at 647.
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justice. Psychiatrists, for example, are convinced that a crime
may be the result of mental disease and yet the criminal's facul-
ties of reason, his powers to premeditate and to scheme may
be unimpaired, and indeed in many cases strengthened, by his
mental condition. Legally, however, unless his powers to dis-
tinguish right from wrong, and his ability to comprehend the
nature and consequences of his act are impaired, he is not im-
mune from punishment. The mere recognition of the "insane
impulse" doctrine does not change the picture. A skilfull
psychiatrist may be convinced that mental disease caused the
defendant to commit the crime for which he is being tried, but
the lay jury must use the yardstick of the right and wrong test
in coming to their verdict. Thus, after a long and expensive
trial, a man has been convicted and sentenced for a murder which
he committed apparently in cold blood and with malice afore-
thought, yet before sentence could be executed the mental paraly-
sis from which he had been suffering for years affected him
physically while in jail, and on being transferred to an asylum
he died within the month.2 3  Conversely, in crimes where in-
sanity is seldom made an issue,.4 mentally diseased individuals
complete their sentences or are released on parole only to com-
mit further offenses. Obviously, the proper treatment requires
confinement indefinitely, with release only if cured. If incurable,
the individual may be at least employed for the benefit of the
state.25 The public, from which juries are impanelled, adheres
to the test of rationality as the measure of a man's guilt, and
for the physician to tell the jury that a man may be perfectly
rational and yet dangerously insane, seems to them to be a con-
tradiction in terms which they are unable to credit in arriving
at their verdict.2 r The rules of law making rationality a test
23A very interesting account of the case referred to in the text, together
with the views of an eperienced criminologist on the subject of rezpon-
bility and the expert witnezs, is to be found in SuLLiv N, Cnnin A:.D
INSANITY (1924) 245, 248.
24 These are crimes such as rape, burglary, and habitual larceny.
2 5 Judge Olson of the Municipal Court of Chicago after pointing out that
one of the most serious wealmesses of the statutory penalty as applied
to the mentally deficient is its failure to prevent the reproduction of de-
fectives, says: "Under such control [confinement to an institution until
cured], there is an abrupt end to criminal depredations and to reproduc-
tion .... They will greatly reduce costs of the defective to society...
for the defective will be able to pay his way -when given proper restraints
and wise management. And other institutions which are well intended
but have practically failed because defectiveness was not understood will
be relieved and permitted to accomplish some good." Olson, Poychopat hi
Laboratory of the Municipal Court of Chicago (1921) 92 CEN-r. L. J. 102,
108.
26 "The force of his (the expert's) testimony is sometimes lessened be-
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are in direct conflict with the present understanding of mental
instability and its influence on crime. Finding the rules in-
flexible, Massachusetts through the enactment of the Briggs Law
ended the conflict by ignoring them.
The most important difference between the laws modelled
upon the provisions of the American Institute bill, and the Briggs
Law, is that under the latter the state need not wait for the issue
of insanity to be raised, while under the former, the issue must
be raised by the defense, or the judge must have good reason
to believe that it will be raised before he can provide for non-
partisan examination of the defendant. Furthermore, under the
Briggs Law the state is provided with machinery capable of
supplying information that may be used in combatting crime of
a predatory or violent nature. Progress in the readjustment
of the criminal law through the study of records collected and
filed by the examiners is possible. 27 There is an incentive to
compel clerks of court and probation officers to keep criminal
records for the use of the examining physicians as is required in
Massachusetts. Such information as to past criminal activity
is essential to the proper diagnosis of the individual to be ex-
amined. In other words, the Briggs Law lays the foundation
for the intelligent study of crime as well as insanity and affords
the means of collecting much needed information hitherto un-
obtainable. It is submitted that the appointment of expert
physicians by the court could not be made to serve such a pur-
pose. Thus, while the appointment of experts by the court
might add to the weight of expert testimony as respects the jury,
such a system fails to profit by the advancement of medicine
in the study of the criminal and the prevention of crime, and
therefore falls short of protecting the public to the extent that
such protection is afforded under the Briggs Law.
ATTACHMENT STATUTES
A recent Maine case I raises for the first time the question of
the constitutionality of the type of attachment statute that pre-
cause he testifies to matters which while true seem improbable to the
iury." BROWN, LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY (1926) 113-114.
27 The examiner who appears in court is restricted by the rules of evi-
dence in making his examination. Evidence of prior indictments is not
admissible in most courts and even a record of conviction is good only
as evidence to impeach and never to prove the charge in the indictment.
And yet psychiatrists need as much of the early history of an individual
as they can acquire in order to make a just diagnosis of his mental con-
dition; hence, the several amendments to the Massachusetts law requiring
that this information be passed on to the board whenever it is available.
'McInnes v. McKay, 141 At. 699 (Me. 1928).
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vails in the New England states. The Mlaine statute - provides
that civil actions shall be commenced by original writs framed
to attach the goods of the defendant. In an action instituted
under this statute the defendant challenged its constitutionality
upon the ground that such general attachment in advance of
judgment deprived him of his property without due process of
law, in that the statute did not require an affidavit setting out the
cause of the attachment, or a bond as security for good faith.
Although there is a total lack of authority upon the precise ques-
tion, the decision upholding the law seems sound. The court
points out that long acquiescense in the operation of a law has
always been recognized as a cogent argument against its invalid-
ity; 3 the statute in question, with slight changes, had been in
operation unquestioned since 1820. In addition, the court's con-
tention that the constitutional prohibition did not include the
taking of property under an attachment for the purpose of fur-
nishing security for the satisfaction of a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff seems well founded.4  Even if this should be re-
garded as a prohibited taking it would seem that the require-
ments of due process are satisfied.
Statutes practically identical with the one in question exist in
iklassachusetts, Connecticut,7 and New Hampshire.0 Although
Rhode Island 9 requires an affidavit to be signed by the plaintiff
or his attorney to the effect that there is a just claim due against
the defendant, the practice there is as broad in scope as in the
other states except for one limitation mentioned below. This is
2 IE. R Sv. STAT. (1916) c. 86, § 2.
3 Cf. State v. Stimpson, 78 Vt. 124, 62 Atl 14 (1905) (long acquieczcence
considered as valid argument for upholding a statute providing for begin-
ning prosecutions for felonies by information); Levin v. United Statec, 123
Fed. 826 (C. C. A. 8th, 1904) (act of Congress authorizing state courts to
naturalize aliens upheld upon this ground).
4 In a case where it was contended that unless the affidavit is served with
the summons the procedure in attachment amounted to a taking without due
process, it was held that there was no taking within the constitutional
prohibition. American Bank v. Goss, 236 N. Y. 488, 142 N. 3. 156 (1923).
5 See Bennett v. Davis, 90 M le. 102, 105, 37 Atl. Sf4, 805 (197) ; Randall v.
Patch, 118 Me. 303, 305, 108 Atl. 97, 98 (1919) ; Inhabitaut3 of Yor Har-
bor v. Libby, 126 Me. 537, 539, 140 Atl. 382, 385 (1928).
G MASS. GEx. LAws (1921) c. 223, § 42. "All real and perzonal property
liable to be taken on execution ... may be attached upon the original writ
in any action in which debt or damages are recoverable, and may ba held
as security to satisfy such judgment as the plaintiff may recover."
7 CONN. GEN. STAT. (1918) § 5S61. "Attachment may be granted upon all
complaints containing a money demand against the estate of the defendant."
S N. H. Pun. LAws (1926) c. 332, § 1. "All property real and pfTrzonal
which is liable to be taken in execution may be attached and holdcn for the
judgment the plaintiff may recover."
9 R, I. GE,;N. LAWS (1923) § 5146.
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due to the custom, sanctioned by statute,", by which attorneys
keep on hand a supply of form writs having stamped upon them
a facsimile of the signature of the clerk of the superior court.'
By this means the attorneys need only fill out the form when the
occasion arises. The procedure in Connecticut is much the same.
Every resident attorney in good standing is a commissioner of
the superior court," authorized to sign writs of attachment.1"
Since under the statute the plaintiff is not required to post a bond
as security for his good faith in prosecuting the action, other
than the bond for costs required in all civil actions, this prac-
tice affords ample opportunity for abuse. Some statistics pub-
lished in a recent number of the Connecticut Bar Journal 11 are
helpful in determining the value of this practice. The figures
indicate that the Connecticut practice is very effective in aiding
collections and settlements out of court when the defendant has
.property.14 But apparently attorneys do not hesitate to provide
for a large margin between the amount of the attachment and the
possible recovery." Where no bond or undertaking is required
the defendant's only remedies for an illegal or excessive attach-
ment are an application to a judge for release or reduction of
attachment, 6 and a possible claim for damages for malicious
abuse of process.' 7  If the defendant is able to procure a surety
he may put up a bond equal to the value of the property attached
and retain possession of the property.28 The Vermont statute,0
10 Ibid. § 5135.
1 Conn. Acts 1921, c. 67.
12 CONN. GEN. STAT. (1918) § 5628. The result of these two provisions is
that attorneys issue the writ themselves. But where an attorney is in-
terested as a party a writ signed by him may be abated. Doolittle v. Clark,
47 Conn. 316 (1879).
3See Clark, Research in Law Administration (1928) 2 CONN. BAn T.
211, 229.
'4 Ibid. In the superior courts of the state in the year 1925-1926 attach-
ments were ordered in 2627 cases. Of these, attachments were levied in
1607 cases, of which 1082 were withdrawn or discontinued before judgment.
is Ibid. In twelve of the cases in which a judgment was recovered, the
difference between the amount recovered and the value of the property
attached, was between $1 and $100; in ten, between $100 and $200; in fifty-
nine, between $200 and $500; in sixty-one, between $500 and $1000; In
sixty, between $1000 and $2000; in sixty-four between $2000 and $5000; and
in sixty-eight, over $5000.
10 CONN. GEN. STAT. (1918) §§ 5892, 5893. It has been held that the
power of a judge upon an application for the reduction or dissolution of an
attachment is confined to a decision as to excess or illegality. He has no
authority to weigh the plaintiff's chances of success, and dissolve the
attachment because he does not believe that the plaintiff will obtain a
judgment. Sachs v. Nussenbaum, 92 Conn. 682, 104 AtI. 393 (1918).
- This claim is, of course, very difficult to prove. See Clark, op. cit. supra
note 13, at 228.
18 CONN. GEN. STAT. (1918) §§ 5884-5887.
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which is practically identical with that of Maine in other
respects, requires the plaintiff before attachment to post a recog-
nizance by one other than the plaintiff that the latter shall prose-
cute the -writ with effect, and shall answer all costs and damages
that the defendant may recover.
Attachment may be had in actions arising out of tort as well as
in those arising out of contract, in all of the New England
states 211 except Rhode Island. There attaclmient may be had in
a tort action only when it is against a non-resident.21 Rhode
Island also provides for attachment in equity in suits on claims
for which it would be available if the action were at law.
=
In most states outside of New England the remedy by attach-
ment is confined to cases coming within certain categories speci-
fied in the statutes. It is difficult to generalize because the stat-
utes and judicial interpretations vary. Mlost of the statutes still
require as a prerequisite that the claim arise out of contract,23
and be already due. West Virginia provides for attaclment in
a suit in equity for a claim not yet due,2 and other states allow
the remedy in law actions for claims not due making the require-
ments more strict in these cases.25 By most statutes attachment
is not allowed where the creditor has other security,. ' In gen-
eral it may be said that even witlin the above restrictions attach-
ment in these states is allowed only when the defendant is a
non-resident or is attempting to abscond or dispose of his prop-
erty. 27 Moreover, most of these statutes require the plaintiff to
file an affidavit stating the nature and amount of his claim with
the grounds of the attachment, and in addition he must furnish a
bond conditioned upon payment of costs and damages, if the
29 VT. GEN. LAws (1917) §§ 1678, 1701, 1707.
20 See supra notes 2, 6, 7, and 8.
2 R. I. GEN. LAWS (1923) § 5160.
22 Ibid. § 5159.
23 DRAKE, ATTACHMENT (7th ed. 1S91) § 10; 1 SHINN, ATT,%c EmNT AND
GARNISHmENT (1896) § 12; 74 CENT. L J. 399 (1912). But cf. N. Y. CODE
Cirv. PRoc. § 635 (providing for attachment in tort actions); Micu. Comp.
LAws (Cahill, 1915) § 13049, semble; WAsH. CoiiP. STAT. (Remington,
1922) § 648 (attachment on claim for damages arising out of the commis-
sion of a felony or seduction); 2 MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 9342 (at-
tachment in actions for money demand excepting actions for libel, slander,
seduction, breach of promise to marry, false imprisonment, malicious prose-
cution, assault, and battery).
24 An affidavit must state when the claim will become due. W. VA. CoD
ANN. (Barnes, 1923) c. 106, § 1. The constitutionality of this statute has
been upheld. McKinsey v. Squires, 32 W. Va. 41, 9 S. E. 55 (1889).
25 1 WADE, ATTACHMENTS (1887) § 162. As examples cf. WAsH. ConP.
STAT. (Remington, 1922) § 649; MONT. REV. CoDos (Choate, 1921) § 9258.
2G 1 SHINN, OP. cit. supra note 23, § 24.
27 1 WADE, op. cit. supra note 25, §§ 75, 8.4-98. As e-xamples cf. N. Y.
CODE Crv. PRoC. § 636; ILL. Rm. STAT. (Cahill, 1927) c. 11, § 1; P,%. STAT.
(West, 1920) § 17160.
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judgment is for the defendant, or if the warrant is vacated.2
In Michigan and Delaware no bond is required where the claim
arises out of contract, 9 but in Michigan the plaintiff must post a
bond when he proceeds by attachment in a tort action ° A stat-
ute requiring the bond in case of an action against a resident,
but dispensing with it in an action against a non-resident has
been held not unconstitutional.31
In some of the far western states 32 the plaintiff may have the
defendant's property attached in any action upon an unsecured
contract, made within the state, for the direct payment of money;
and also in either contract or tort actions against a non-resident.
An affidavit must state that the claim is within the statute and
further that the attachment is not sought to hinder, delay, or
defraud creditors of the defendant. A bond not exceeding the
amount of the claim, nor less than $200, must be posted by the
plaintiff. The Montana statute adopts these provisions in cases
where the debt is due, but when attachment is sought for a debt
not yet due the plaintiff must state in his affidavit either that the
defendant has absconded or is about to do so, or that he is fraud-
ulently disposing of his property.
33
It is to be noted that in attachment proceedings the federal
courts require the attaching creditor to comply with the law of
the state in which the initial proceeding is brought.3 4
Since attachment is a remedy that exists only by statute the
provisions of the statute must be strictly complied with before
the writ can be legally issued. Where the affidavit and bond are
required they are conditions precedent to the jurisdiction to pro-
ceed with the attachment.3 5 In many states the writ of attach-
281 WADE, op. cit. supra note 25, §§ 64-73, 102. As examples of. ILL. II-V.
STAT. (Cahill, 1927) c. 11, § 2; PA. STAT. (West, 1920) § 17160; WASII.
Comp. STAT. (Remington, 1922) § 647. The New York statute does not
require the bond where the action is brought to recover money held by
governmental agency which has been wrongfully converted or disponcd of,
or where the defendant's responsibility arose out of his own false statement
in writing as to his credit. N. Y. CODE Civ. PRoc. §§ 639, 640.
29 MICH. ComP. LAWS (Cahill, 1915) §§ 13028, 13029; DEL. RnV. CODE
(1915) § 4118.
30 Ibid. § 13049.
31 Central Loan and Trust Co. v. Campbell, 173 U. S. 84, 19 Sup. Ct. 346
(1899) (classification reasonable because of the greater difficulty in satisfy-
ing a judgment against a non-resident).
32 CAL. CODES OF CIV. PROC. (Deering, 1923) §§ 537, 538, 539; N11v. REV.
LAws (1919) § 5147; ORE. LAWS (Olson, 1920) §§ 296, 297; IDAno CoAmx.
STAT. (1919) §§ 6779, 6780, 6781.
83 MONT. Rnv. CODES (Choate, 1921) §§ 9256, 9257, 9258.
34 Savings Bank of Danbury v. Lowe, 242 U. S. 357, 37 Sup. Ct. 172
(1917); Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U. S. 131, 8 Sup. Ct. 379 (1888); 17 STAT.
197 (1872), 28 U. S, C. § 726 (1926).
.85 Sousa v. Lucas, 156 Cal. 460, 105 Pac. 413 (1909) ; DRAxE, op. cit. supra
note 23, §§ 87, 115.
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ment must be preceded by a summons or capias, but in others it
issues as the original writ serving as both summons and attach-
mentV 6 Originally the writ was regarded as a form of distress
for the purpose of coercing the appearance of the defendant,37
Its principal purpose now is to furnish security to the plaintiff
for any judgment he may obtain.2s Thus its effect is to give the
plaintiff a lien on the attached property.2 3 The duration of this
lien is limited by statute4
There can be no doubt that attachment is the best method yet
devised for facilitating the collection of claims and for prevent-
ing the fraudulent disposition of property by debtors. Since this
is the end toward which every statute dealing with the subject
should be directed, it seems wise policy to extend the scope of
the remedy as far as the necessity for protecting the debtor from
abuse of process permits. Sufficient protection is given by re-
quiring the attaching party to furnish a bond at least equal to
the value of the property under the writ. With this safeguard,
therefore, the broad scope of the New England statutes would
seem to give a most effective and at the same time unimpeach-
able procedure.
CAPACITY OF A MARRIED WOMAN TO ACQUIRE SEPARATE DOMICIL
The domicil of the wife, both in England' and in the United
States,2 is, in general, determined by that of the husband, even
though the wife has never lived at her husband's domicil.2 Two
SG 1 SHnNN, op. cit. supra note 23, § 3.
37 1 WADE, op. cit. supra note 25, § 1; see Barber v. Morgan, , Conn. c18,
622, 80 Atl. 791, 792 (1911); Coit v. Sistare, 85 Conn. 573, 577, 84 Ati.
119, 121 (1912).
ss Ibid. 577, 84 AtI. at 121.
39 Meyers v. Mott, 29 Cal. 359 (1866) (death of defendant before judgment
terminates the lien); Coit v. Sistare, su'pra note 37; 1 WADu, op. cit. opm
note 25, § 27.
40 In Connecticut, if execution is not levied within sLxty days after judg-
ment, the lien is dissolved. CoNN. GEN. STAT. (191S) § 5914. The usual
period is between thirty and slxty days after judgment.
IDolphin v. Robins, 7 H. L. Cas. 389 (1859); Yelverton v. Yelverton, 1
Sw. & Tr. 574 (1859); In re Mackenzie, [1911] 1 Ch. 578; Lord Advocate
v. Jaifrey, [1921] A. C. 146; Alberta v. Cook, [1926] A. C. 444; see War-
render v. Warrender, 9 Bli. N. S. 89, 103 (1834) ; DiCEY, CoNFLIic oF LAWS
(2d ed. 190S) 124, 132, 134; (1921) 30 YAL L. J. 631.
2 Kennedy v. Kennedy, 87 Ill. 250 (1877) ; TMcClellen v. Carroll, 42 S. W.
185 (Tenn. 1897) ; In re Geiser's Will, 82 N. J. Eq. 311, 87 AtL 628 (1913) ;
Bruce v. Bruce, 3 S. W. (2d) 6 (Ark. 1928); CONrLIcr o5 LWs RTrAT-
=dNT (Am. L. Inst. 1925) § 29; GoODRICH, CONFLICT or LAws (1927) §
30; MiNoR, CoxLicr OF LAWS (1901) § 46.
3 Yelverton v. Yelverton, supra note 1; Thomas v. Thorns, 222 Ill. App.
618 (1921); Com NTAnins ON CoxmNic OF LAWS RESTATE=:1T (Am. L.
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reasons have been "assigned for the rule.4 The first was the fic-
titious identity of person of husband and wife; r the second,
that public- policy demanded that the family unit be protected
by allowing one family to have only one domicil.0 The fiction
'that husband and wife are legally one person has practically
vanished,7 but the idea that the welfare of society demands the
protection and preservation of the family as a unit still persists.
In England a married woman has always been incapable of ac-
quiring separate domicil for any purpose whatever., The Eng-
lish rule was followed by a few early American cases,9 but recog-
tition of the failure of the reasons supporting the rule soon
led the courts of this country to adopt a more liberal view. The
-hardship 10 of compelling the wife to follow the husband wher-
ever he might choose to establish his domicil, for the purpose
of obtaining a divorce, induced the first step toward liberality,
namely, that where the husband was guilty of acts which gave
ground for divorce the wife might retain the matrimonial domi-
cil " in order to secure such divorce.12 Where the unity of the
family has in fact been dissolved 13 there would seem to be little,
if any, reason for refusing to permit the wife to acquire a
separate domicil. Practically all American courts permit the
Inst. 1925) § 29.2, n. 2 and cases cited; see Warrender v. Warrender, supra.
note 1, at 104.
4 CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1925) § 29.1.
5 1 EL. COiMI. *442; see Heyman v. Heyman, 19 Ga. App, 634, 92 S. E.
25, 26 (1917); Taubman v. Davis, 199 Mo. App. 439, 443, 203 S. W. 654,
656 (1918).
a Beale, Domicil of a Married Woman (1917) 2 So. L. Q. 93.
7See Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U. S. 619, 625, 34 Sup. Ct. 442 (1914) ;
Note (1921) 20 Micn. L. REv. 86, 88.
8 Warrender v. Warrender, supra note 1; Re Daly, 25 Beav. 456 (1858) ;
Dolphin v. Robins; Yelverton v. Yelverton; In re Mackenzie; Alberta v.
Cook, all supra note 1; H. v. H., [1928] 2 P. 206; Hughes, Judicial Method
and the Problem in Ogden v. Ogden (1928) 14 L. Q. R-v. 217.
9 Smith v. Moorehead, 6 Jones Eq. 360 (N. C. 1863); see Harrison v.
Harrison, 20 Ala. 629, 644 (1852).
10 See Goodrich, Divorce and Conflict of Laws (1923) 2 Tex. L. RmV. 1, 9.
11 .. matrimonial domicil means nothing more than the place where
the parties last lived as husband and wife with the intent of making that
place their home, and which was still the domicil of the one spouse when the
'divorce action was brought." Ibid. 12; see also Fox, The Recognition of
Foreign Decrees of Divorce (1927) 33 W. VA. L. Q. 139, 149.
12 Shaw v. Shaw, 98 Mass. 158 (1867); Burtis v. Burtis, 167 Mass. 508,
37 N. E. 740 (1894); see Harteau v. Harteau, 14 Pick. 181, 185 (Mass.
1833).; cf. Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 26 Sup. Ct. 525 (1906);
Corkum v. Clark, 161 N. E. 912 (Mass. 1928).
13 That is, husband and wife "have severed marital relations and intend
to live apart." This is also the suggestion of Mr. Page, citpd infra noto
17. " ... a wife may acquire a domicil separate and distinct from that of
her husband, where the unity of husband and wife has been breached."
fHairs v. Hairs, 300 S. W. 540, 543 (Mo. 1927).
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wronged wife to acquire a separate domicil for purposes of
divorce 1 4 and many allow her to acquire such domicil for all
purposes. 5 The American Law Institute states that the limit
of the law today is that "if a wife lives apart from her husband
without being guilty of desertion,", she may acquire a separate
domicily.7 The reasoning that the wife should be allowed to
acquire a separate domicil once the family unity has disappeared
would seem to apply with equal force to the case where she is
herself at fault. Artificial rules of domicil can have no power
to preserve the unity of a family the members of which are
estranged, nor does it seem desirable that they should. 5 A few
cases have already gone to the extent of allowing a wife who
was at fault to acquire a separate domicil,19 but the weight of
authority appears to be to the contrary.2
14 Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108 (U. S. 1869); Michael v. Michael, 34
Tex. Civ. App. 630, 79 S. W. 74 (1904) ; Sneed v. Sneed, 14 Ariz. 17, 12.3
Pac. 312 (1912); Rinaldi v. Rinaldi, 19 N. J. Eq. 14, 113 Atl. 685 (1922);
Herron v. Passailaigue, 110 So. 539 (Fla. 1926); see MINon, CONFLICT or
LAWS (1901) § 50; Beale, op. cit. szpra note 6, at 101.
15 Shute v. Sargent, 67 N. H. 305, 36 AtI. 282 (1893) (administration of
estate); Watertown v. Greaves, 112 Fed. 183 (C. C. A. 1st, 1901) (suit for
tort); Bradford v. City of Worcester, 184 Mass. 557, 69 N. E. 310 (190)
(pauper settlement); Gordon v. Yost, 140 Fed. 79 (C. C. W. Va. 1005)
(alienation of affections); Buchholz v. Buchholz, 63 Wasl 215, 115 Pac. 88
(1911) (administration of estate); Fitch v. Huff, 213 Fed. 17 (C. C. A.
4th, 1914) (tort action); Williamson v. Osenton, aupra note 7 (damage
suit); Rector v. Rector, 186 N. C. 618, 120 S. E. 195 (1923) (suit for
alimony without divorce); (1921) 30 YAIx L. J. 631. Contra: Estate of
Wickes, 128 Cal. 270, 60 Pac. 867 (1900).
16 The question arises as to what law is to determine whether or not the
wife has been guilty of desertion. It is believed that the law of the forum
should decide, though under the view referred to infra note 22, the law of
the prior domicil would be determinative.
17 CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATE7\mNT (Am. L. Inst. 1925) § 20. Two of
the Advisers working on the Restatement advocate a further extension of
the law, Mr. Goodrich suggesting that a wife should be permittc d to acquire
a separate domicil if she live apart from her husband and Mr. Page suggest-
ing that she be allowed to do so if she and her husband have severed marital
relations and intend to live apart. Ibid. 4.
is Note (1921) 20 MICH. L. REv. 86, 89.
19 Smith v. Smith, 4 Mackey 255 (D. C. 1885); Chapman v. Chapman,
129 Ill. 386, 21 N. E. 806 (1889); Saperstone v. Saperstone, 73 Misc. 631,
131 N. Y. Supp. 241 (Sup. Ct. 1911) ; Matter of Dunning, 211 InI. App. 033
(1918). A wife may acquire separate domicil " ... whenever the wife has
adversary interests to those of her husband,-[but] she cannot acquira
such a domicil so long as the unity of the marriage relation continues... 11
See Howland v. Granger, 22 R. I. 1, 2, 45 At. 7 0 (1900); cf. Prater v.
Prater, 87 Tenn. 78 (1888).
20 Matter of Bushby, 59 Misc. 317, 112 N. Y. Supp. 202 (Surr. Ct. 190);
Pane v. Pane, 152 La. 415, 93 So. 246 (1922); see Cheely v. Clayton, 110 U.
S. 701, 705, 4 Sup. Ct. 328, 332 (1884); "C!llum v. Hervey, 3 S. W. (2d)
993, 995 (Ark. 1928); GOODRICH, op. cit. sapra note 2, § 32.
3
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It has been said 21 that "the power to acquire a domicil must
depend upon whether the person is capable of acquiring a domicil
first, by the law of his prior domicil and second, by the law of
the place where he attempts to acquire a new domicil." 22 The
basis for this statement would seem to be the theory that the
law defining the legal relations of any one person, often called
"status," 23 should be uniform 24 in all jurisdictions.21
In the recent case of Torlonia v. Torlonia,2 the plaintiff left
her husband, domiciled in and a citizen of Italy, and established
her domicil in Connecticut, where she brought suit for divorce on
the ground of adultery. The court held that she had the power
to establish a domicil in Connecticut for the purpose of obtaining
a divorce,27 regardless of the fact that "under the law of Italy,
the husband is entitled to the control of the wife to the extent
that she must follow him wherever he chooses to establish his
21 CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1925) § 11.2.
22 In support of this statement only one case is cited. In that case a
resident of Ohio went to Florida at the age of nineteen and there attempted
to establish her domicil. Under the law of Ohio she would have been cap-
able of acquiring a domicil of choice at the age of eighteen; under Florida
law she could not do so until she was twenty-one. The Florida court hold
that she could not establish a domicil of choice until she became capable
under the law of Florida. Beekman v. Beekman, 53 Fla. 858, 43 So. 923
(1907). The reporter infers that the converse would also be true i. c., that
the Florida court would hold her incapable of acquiring a domicil of choice
if the Ohio law required her to be twenty-one, even though Florida law only
required her to be eighteen-in other words, that the court would require
that she be capable under the laws of both Ohio and Florida. It is sub-
mitted that such an inference has no justification in the case. Of. Hiestand
v. Kuns, 8 Blackf. 345 (Ind. 1847), where on similar facts capability under
the law of Ohio was held to be sufficient, regardless of lack of capability
under Indiana law.
23 See Cleveland, Status in Common Law (1925) 38 HARV. L. RNV. 1074.
The term "status" seems to denote an indefinite aggregation of legal rela-
tions not susceptible to accurate definition.
24 "It can by no means be assumed that uniformity and certainty are the
sole ends to be attained." Yntema, The Hornboov Method and the Conflict
of Laws (1928) 37 YALEI L. J. 468, 479.
25 ,"... it is necessary that there should be one universal rule whereby to
determine whether parties are to be regarded as married or not." 1 13isnoP,
MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND SEPARATION (1st ed. 1891) § 856; see CONFLICT OF
LAws RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1925) § 13.2.
26 142 At]. 843 (Conn.. 1928).
27 English courts, in general, will not recognize the jurisdiction of foreign
courts in matters of divorce unless both parties to the marriage bond
are domiciled in the country whose court granted the divorce. See The
Validity of Foreign Divorces in English Courts (1926) 70 SOL. J. 1126,
1127. In speaking of domicil a court may mean one of two things: (1)
the domicil necessary to confer jurisdiction, (2) the domicil determining
what rules of the conflict of laws are to be applied. For an example of




residence, except as such control may be modified or affected by
a decree of an Italian court of competent jurisdictionY3 The
decree of divorce granted in this case would be refused recog-
nition in an Italian court because of lack of jurisdiction in the
Connecticut court. 2  Although there may be theoretical objec-
tions to the situation, the plaintiff being divorced in Connecticut
but regarded as married in Italy, it nevertheless seems quite
justifiable from a practical point of view.0 The finding that
the plaintiff has set up her domicil in Connecticut amounts to
a finding that she intends to reside there indefinitely.3' Since
her home is to be in Connecticut,- it would seem that she should
be entitled to have her legal relations determined by the law
that has grown out of the mores of the community in which she
expects to live.33  Some confusion may occasionally result, but
this does not appear to be a compelling reason for denying her




8 ITALIAN CIv. CODE, art. IS; Deput. Prov. di Novara v. Deput. Prov. di
Milano (App. Milan) Mlonitore 1886, 910; 1 Ricci, Conso Tconrro PracTiCo
DI Dmrrxo CIvWL (3d ed. 1923) 276.
29 This would be true regardless of the fact that under the municipal law
of Italy divorce is not allowed. See Cass. Turin, La Legge 189d, 2, 515;
Civ. CODE, art. 148.
S" . . . a general principle of uniformity ... can never corrcp ,nd to
the realities of judicial administration." Yntema, loc. cit. .upra note 2..
31 Foss v. Foss, 105 Conn. 502, 136 Atl. 93 (1927) ; Youngblood v. Rector,
126 Okla. 210, 259 Pac. 579 (1927). In general, one of the requisites of
establishing a domicil of choice is the intention to remain indcfinitcly. ScD
Comment (1927) 36 YAIn L. J. 408, 412.
32 "Where one has one's fixed home or habitat, there is one's donlicil."
Coudert, Soize Considerations of the Lazo of Domicil (1927) 3if YAI- L. T.
949.
3, ,,... it will probably be safer, if we must suggest a general principle,
to insist upon a just decision than upon one which may as well as not be
erroneously believed to be uniform." Yntema, loc. cit. cupra note 21.
-No case has been found which, in ruling on the domicil of a married
woman, has required that she be capable of acquiring domicil both by the
law of her prior domicil and by the law of the state wherein she seft to
acquire a new domicil.
